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THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGES.
It is a well-settled principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that
the law will not permit a thing to be done indirectly which cannot
legally be done directly. The application of this proposition to
International Law has given rise to what is known as the doctrine
of continuous voyages.
Originating in the decisions of English prize courts, the prin-
ciple was chiefly applied and developed in the admiralty courts of
Great Britain and the United States until it became a recognized
part of International Law in governing the rights of neutrals to
trade with belligerents in time of war. The application of the
doctrine throughout its history has caused bitter controversy be-
tween England and the United States, the two nations which have*
been most instrumental in securing a place for it in the laws of
nations.
Origin and early history.
The principle seems to have been first applied in 1761 in two
cases before the English Lords of Appeal, The Africa and the
St. Croix, Burrell 228, 229. During the Seven Years War, which
was then going on, English subjects were forbidden to trade with
the French. Attempts on the part of English captains to do this
indirectly by connecting with French ships at neutral ports were
held to violate the rule and subject the ships to condemnation.
(Woolsey: Some Early Cases on the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages.
4 Am. Jour. Int. L. 823, 844.)
It was not till the close of the eighteenth century, however,
that the doctrine really became well defined in cases arising out
of the "Rule of 1756." Up to that date each European nation
had retained the exclusive right of trading with its own colonies.
During the Seven Years War the English navy drove French com-
merce from the seas, practically isolating France from her colonies.
France attempted to obviate this by granting colonial trade rights
to the Dutch, but the English declared in the "Rule of 1756" that
neutrals in time of war could not enjoy a trade from which they
were barred in time of peace and proceeded to seize and'condemn
Dutch ships plying between France and her colonies on the ground
that they were virtually French ships. (4 Am. Jour. Int. L. 835.)
Upon the breaking out of the Napoleonic Wars England again
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declared this rule in force and denied the right of neutrals to trade
between France and Spain and their colonies. Neutral governments,
including that of the United States, protested vigorously, but un-
availingly that the Rule of 1756 was no longer in effect. To evade
the operation of the rule American ships would make voyages from
the French West Indies to American ports and thence to France,
claiming that these were two distinct voyages and therefore legal, since
England could not prevent trade between France and neutral coun-
tries so long as the rules against contraband and blockade were not
violated. But the English courts held that in cases in which the
stop at the intermediate port was merely a subterfuge the voyage
was to be considered continuous between France and her colonies,
subjecting guilty vessels to condemnation. The determination of
the bona fides of the stop at the neutral port raised questions of
.evidence and it was at first held by Sir William Scott that proof
of landing the goods and payment of duties at the American ports
was sufficient to establish two distinct and lawful voyages. (The
Polly, 2 C. Rob. 361.) American shippers now adopted the policy
of paying duties in American ports on all such voyages and the
English courts were soon forced to change the law. In 1806 Sir
William Grant held that the landing of goods and payment of duties
was not conclusive of good faith, that there must be an honest
intention to bring them into the common stock of the neutral port,
The William, 5 C. Rob. 395.
Blockade and Contraband.
Being founded on recognized principles of justice, the doctrine
was destined to outlive the circumstances under which it was first
applied 'and to play an important part in later wars. The next
branch of International Law to which it was applied was the subject
of contraband. This application of the doctrine seems to have been
foretold during the first period of its history in Sir William Grant's
reference in his opinion in The William, supra, to an earlier case,
The Eagle, and some writers claim to have found dicta recognizing
it in cases decided as early as 1761, (4 Am. Jour. Int. L. 832.) The
first noteworthy application of the rule to contraband occurred in
1855 during the Crimean War. A Dutch ship, the Frau Howina,
was captured en rofite from Lisbon to Hamburg, carrying salt-
peter which was in fact destined to Russia. The cargo was condemn-
ed by a French prize court, applying the doctrine of continuous




Such was the state of the law when the American Civil War
broke out in 1861. The doctrine was now to receive more vigorous
application than perhaps ever before.
President Lincoln immediately ordered a blockade of all southern
ports, so that neutral vessels attempting to carry war supplies to
the Confederacy would incur penalties for both carrying contraband
and running the blockade. English merchants desiring" to trade
with the Confederates and to minimize the dangers of suffering
the penalties referred to, made the port of Nassau in the Bahama
Islands off the coast of Florida the center of a thriving commerce
as a point of transshipment to the southern ports. The chances
of capture of the blockade runners on the short voyage from Nassau
were comparatively slight, while the English claimed that their
increased commerce between England and Nassau was entirely
legitimate and entitled to exemption from interference.
In 1863 the British steamer Dolphin bound for Nassau was
captured by a Union cruiser and claimed as a prize. It carried rifles
and sabers billed for Nassau but there was evidence that the real
destination of vessel and cargo was a Confederate port and both
were condemned in the United States District Court, The Dolphin,
7 Fed. Cas. 868.
The first case involving the doctrine which came before the
United States Supreme Court was The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514.
The vessel was a British ship carrying munitions of war and much
mail for Confederate ports, though it was ostensibly bound for
Nassau. Both ship and cargo were condemned, the court applying
the doctrine of continuous voyages formulated by the English courts
sixty years before. It was held that neutral trade from one neutral
port to another is entitled to protection only when the cargo is
intended to become part of the common stock of the neutral port.
"Successive voyages connected by a common plan form a plural
unit" and the vessel is liable to condemnation if the owner knows
the actual destination of the goods. The court also based their
decision on evidence of an intent on the part of the ship to run the
blockade.
Another celebrated case of this period was The Peterhof, 5
Wallace 28. The ship was carrying supplies for the Confederate
army from England to Matamoras, Mexico, a port just across the
Rio Grande from Texas, which was sharing Nassau's commercial
prominence for like reasons. The ship was released on the ground
that a neutral port could not be legally blockaded, but the con-
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traband portion of its cargo was condemned on the finding that
its real destination was the Confederate camps across the river.
The most famous and most severely criticised decision of this
series was the case of The Springbok, 5 Wallace 1. The ship was
captured was proved to have been bound in good faith for Nassau.
Most of the cargo was either absolute or conditional contraband,
but this fact seems not to have been known to the owners of the
vessel. The nature of the freight was not shown by the bills of
lading, which were "to order." It was proved that the cargo
was part of a stock from which two previously condemned prizes
had been loaded, and the whole evidence satisfied the court that
the real destination of the freight was not Nassau but some southern
port. The cargo was accordingly condemned, but the ship itself
was released. The ratio decidendi seems mainly to have been that
the real destination of the cargo was some blockaded port.
These American decisions aroused a storm of protest in Eng-
land. In an insurance case arising out of the capture of the Peter-
hof, Hobbs vs. Henning, 17 C. B. n. s. 791, the English Court of
Common Pleas held "that goods that are contraband of war in
the course of transport from a neutral port to a neutral port in
a neutral ship are not, by the law of nations liable to seizure by
the cruiser of a belligerent state even though the shipper may know
or intend that they shall ultimately reach a port belonging to the
enemies of the captor." The British government, however, re-
fused to make any official protest to the United States, though a
recent writer speaks of its attitude as "acquiescence rather than
approval." (Garner: International Law in the European War,
9 Am. Jour. Int. L. 372.) The International Commission which
passed upon claims of England and the United States arising out
of the Civil War unanimously dismissed all those resulting from
the condemnation of the Peterhof, the Bermuda, the Dolphin and
allowed a small claim for the detention of the vessel itself in The
Springbok case.
The decisions have been severely criticised by English writers
on International Law, including Twiss, Phillimore, Baker, and
Creasy. American authorities have also not been unanimous
in their approval of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court
in arriving at their decisions. Most of the criticism has been directed
against The Springbok and particularly the extension of the doctrine
to blockade, which the American judges were accused of confusing
with rules relating to contraband. Mr. Lester H. Woolsey says in
a note to a paper in the fourth volume of the American Journal of
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International Law at page 830 that "among all the English and
American cases examined one has not been found in which the
doctrine was directly and exclusively applied to a purely blockade
case." The case of The Pearl, 5 Wallace 574, was one in which
the captured vessel "carried no cargo except ten bales of seamen's
jackets and cloth" and the opinion makes no further allusion to
the character or destination of the cargo. The vessel was con-
demned because the court were "not satisfied that her voyage was
to terminate at Nassau" but were "satisfied on the contrary that
she was destined either immediately after touching at that port, or
as soon as practicable after needed repairs, for one of the ports of
the blockaded coasts." Intended breach of blockade was one of
the grounds of the decision of The Bermuda, supra, and seems to
have been the main basis for the court's holding in The Springbok,
supra. The Court says in the latter case: "But we do not now
refer to the character of the cargo for the purpose of determining
whether it was liable to condemnation as contraband but for the
purpose of ascertaining its real destination; for we repeat, con-
traband or not, it could not be condemned if really destined for
Nassau and not beyond; and contraband or not, it must be condemned
if destined to any rebel port, for all rebel ports were under blockade."
The foregoing cases seem to be definite authorities supporting the
proposition that the doctrine applies to blockade. In view of the
fact that under the British and American rule a ship may be cap-
tured on any stage of an intended voyage to a blockaded port the
application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to this class of
cases appears to be logical and equitable, provided the evidence
of guilty intention is sufficient.
The Springbok decision was a departure, however, in holding
that the guilt of the cargo rather than that of the vessel is con-
trolling, for previously it had been universally held that penalties
for breach of blockade attached to goods only through the wrong-
ful act of the vessel. Fault was also found with the rules of evidence
followed by the American courts, Dr. Baty characterizing the
procedure of our tribunals as a "roving inquiry into all sorts of
presumptions while the voyage is yet in its initial stage." The
language referred to the practice of the American courts in in-
quiring into facts other than those disclosed by the ship's papers.
Later History of the Doctrine.
The doctrine survived despite the attacks of its English oppon-
ents and in due time was to find favor even in their eyes. In 1885
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France invoked the doctrine in seizing neutral vessels carrying
contraband to Hong Kong which was really destined for the Chinese
government, with which France was at war. England protested
earnestly against this action. During the Italo-Abyssinian War
in 1895 the doctrine was applied by Italy to the Dutch steamer
Doelwjyk which was carrying munitions intended for Abyssinia.
The cargo was to be unloaded at the neutral port of Djibouti and
thence transported overland to the ultimate destination. The
case was thus similar to The Peterhof, supra, and the decision
followed the rule of that case. (Ruys vs. Royal Exch. Assur. Co.,
2 Com. Cas. 201.)
Great Britain found it convenient to recognize the doctrine
as applied to contraband for the first time during the Boer War
in 1899. She seized German ships bound for the neutral port of
Lorenzo Marquez on the ground that their cargoes of contraband
were in fact destined for the Boers. The ships were finally released,
however, upon the protest of the German government.
The rules governing the Japanese navy during the Russo-Jap-
anese War recognized the doctrine as applied to contraband and,
according to Professor Charles Noble Gregory, also to blockade.
(Gregory: The Doctrine of Continuous Voyages, 24 Harvard Law
Review 178). No cases arose for its application during that war.
The principle of continuous voyages was taken up at the London
Naval Conference in 1909, and several rules concerning it are to be
found in the Declaration of London adopted by that body. By
Article 30 cabsolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to
be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. It
is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails
transshipment or a subsequent transport by land." Article 33
says that "Conditional contraband is liable to capture if shown
to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government
department of the enemy state," but by article 35 only "when
found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied
by the enemy or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it
is not to be discharged at an intervening neutral port," subject
to the exception contained in article 36, when "the enemy country
has no seaboard." Article 19 is as follows: "Whatever may be
the ulterior destination of a vessel or her cargo, she cannot be cap-
tured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way
to a non-blockaded port." From these quotations it will be seen
that the Declaration intended to abolish the doctrine so far as
blockade is concerned, but recognized it as of full force in cases of
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absolute contraband. In respect to conditional contraband it
was to be applied only where the belligerent has no sea coast.
The provisions of the Declaration of London relating to con-
tinuous voyages, says Lawrence at page 716 of his "Principles of
International Law," "form the grave of a great controversy. In
them it received the usual sepulture, a great compromise." "Not.
dead but sleeping" would have been an appropriate epitaph for the
tomb. Upon the outbreak of the present European War, Great
Britain rudely disinterred and revived the controversy. In an
Order in Council of October 29, 1914, the Declaration of London
was declared to be in effect except that "conditional contraband
shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port
if the goods are consigned 'to order' or if the papers do not show
who is the consignee of the goods or if they show a consignee of the
goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy and it
shall lie upon the owner of the goods to prove that their destination
was innocent." The same Order made numerous and important
additions to the list of absolute contraband included in the Declara-
tion of London, besides practically abolishing all distinction between
absolute and conditional contraband so far as the doctrine of contin-
uous voyages is concerned. In defense of this English writers on
International Law argue that Germany is practically in the position
of having no seaboard and that therefore conditional contraband
is to be put on the same footing as absolute because the German
ports are closed (Bentwich: International Law as Applied by Eng-
land in the War, American Journal of International Law, January,
1915). The same writer also attacks the distinction between ab-
solute and conditional contraband in the Declaration of London
as illogical and unsatisfactory. The American government pro-
tested against the rules laid down in the Order of Council of October
29, 1914, and the reply of Great Britain cited the American Civil
War cases as substantiating her present position. The British
prize courts applied the rules of the Order previously referred to in
the cases of The Kim, The Alfred Nobel, The Bjornsterjne Bjornson,
and The Fridland, (1915) P. 215, decided in July, 1915. The ships
carried mainly American meat products consigned "to order"
at Copenhagen and were seized and condemned by the court on
the ground that Germany was the place of ultimate consumption
of the goods.
The rules laid down by England are being criticised by Amer-
ican authorities on International Law fully as severely as the doc-
trine enunciated by our Supreme Court during the Civil War was
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attacked by English writers. Dr. Edwin M. Borchard in a note
to an article in the American Journal of International Law for
January, 1915, at page 140 points out that the British rule as to
the burden of proof in cases of conditional contraband is contrary
to all the previous holdings on the subject and wholly inconsistent
with the position taken by England in the past. The same criticism
is made by Professor J. W. Garner (Garner: International Law in
the European War, 9 Am. Jour. Int. L. 372.) The latter writer
declares that England is putting her own interpretation on the
Declaration of London in considering Germany a country without
a sea board. He also points out that the circumstances under which
the American cases arose were different from those existing in this
war, in that Nassau had never been of any commercial importance
previous to the war whereas Denmark has been carrying on a trade
of its own with Germany all along and much of the goods shipped
from this country become part of the "common stock" of the coun-
try even though they may eventually find their way to Germany.
Furthermore the fact of the consignment being "to order" was by
the American courts regarded merely as a suspicious circumstance.
Under the English rule that in itself is a presumption of guilt.
The history of the doctrine of continuous voyages discloses the
fact that most of the controversies connected with it have related
t6 the situation to which it should be applied and the rules of evi-
dence followed in finding t&le facts calling for its application. The
protests of the United States against the English application of it
in the early part of the nineteenth century were really against the
enforcement of the Rule of 1756. The American Civil War cases
were criticised chiefly because they departed from certain presump-
tions deducible from the ships' papers theretofore considered con-
clusive and introduced new rules which some authorities feared would
be abused in practice. The application of the doctrine to blockades
was opposed because it was an innovation and might lead to the
virtual "blockade of neutral ports by interpretation." At the
present time the controversy again relates mainly to the evidentiary
questions and whiether it shall be applied to conditional contra-
band. The inherent justice of the doctrine as an abstract legal
proposition has firmly established it in international law. The ef-
forts of jurists of the future should b2 directed toward preventing
its abuse by laying down just and proper rules of evidence for its
application.
H.H.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1/iss3/8
